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The study investigates the performance of electric power sector of Pakistan at the 
firm level, as well as the sector as a whole.  It identifies and attempts to quantify the 
extent of inefficiencies.  Since either physical or financial or productivity indicators alone 
are not able to explain the duality of public infrastructure purposes and the complexity of 
their multi-dimensional goals, a set of relevant physical, financial, and productivity 
indicators have been used in evaluating the performance of this sector.  Further, a Cobb-
Douglas production function has also been used to calculate the trend in the growth of 
total factor productivity.  Economies of scale have also been studied in the case of 
electric power generation. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, considerable emphasis has been placed on the potential for 
private capital to play an important role in infrastructure development, either through 
direct purchase of state enterprises and mixed ownership arrangements or a form of 
Build-Own-Operate-and-Transfer (BOOT) scheme. In part, this stems from the 
difficulties faced by many governments in raising additional funds for large 
infrastructure investments. In addition, however, a second factor has been the 
widely-held perception, expressed clearly by World Bank (1995), that state 
enterprises in most countries have operated with considerable inefficiency, 
particularly in infrastructure, where the large capital involved and the potential for 
external effects at one time appeared to make infrastructure investments natural 
candidates for public provision. There is a body of theory, based on a lack of 
property rights and lack of market discipline, which attempts to rationalise the case 
for inherent public sector inefficiency [Adam, et al. (1992)].  However, this does not 
convince everyone, and to make a firm case for privatisation there is a strong need 
for further empirical studies that demonstrate how public sector infrastructure 
enterprises have actually performed. 
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This paper attempts to contribute to this area by evaluating the performance 
of the public sector enterprises of electricity industry in Pakistan during the period 
1960–95.
  The following section of the paper sets out briefly the development of 
this sector in Pakistan.  The third gives financial indicators for the enterprises 
involved. As is frequently the case, judgments based on financial data on 
enterprise performance can be misleading and, therefore, the fourth section 
considers evidence based on estimated total factor productivity growth, which 
gives a quite different picture on performance. Finally, the fifth section draws 
some conclusions. 
 
2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRICITY IN PAKISTAN: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Pakistan’s two power utilities are the Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA) and the Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation (KESC). The 
former has a national coverage, whilst the latter serves only the Karachi division and 
related areas. WAPDA’s power plants are a mix of hydel and thermal supplies, 
whilst KESC’s are all thermal. Growth in power generation has been very 
substantial, with an increase in aggregate supplies of approximately 12 percent 
annually from 1960 to 1995. Over the same period, per capita power availability 
increased from 28kwh to 444kwh.
1  System losses in the sector, at 24 percent in 
1990, were relatively higher than in many other industrial and developing countries 
[World Bank (1994)]. Both WAPDA and KESC are vertically integrated in the 
production, transmission, and distribution of power, and although they are not 
subject to rate of return regulation, price increases must be approved by the 
government. In real terms, the average unit price for power has remained largely 
constant, with some annual fluctuations, between 1960 and 1995 at around rupees 
1.0 per kwh of WAPDA and around rupees 1.20 for KESC.
2  However, comparative 
tariff data suggests that in dollar terms, tariffs in Pakistan, at least in the 1980s, were 
well below those in comparable economies in the Asian region [Malhotra, et al. 
(1994)]. 
Loadshedding
3 by the two companies has been seen as a major problem over 
the period under consideration and several studies have suggested that power 
bottlenecks have imposed serious costs on the Pakistan’s economy. For example, 
Pasha and Gellerson (1988) and Ali (1990) calculated the loss in industrial output 
from factory closures due to power cuts. The former suggested it might be 9 percent 
of annual industrial output (i.e., a loss of 0.9 billion US dollars or about 2.25 percent 
of GDP). The latter put the annual cost in lost GDP at 1 billion US dollars (i.e., about 
 
1Data cited here come primarily from the published reports of the companies. For full information 
on the sources, see [Ghafoor (2000), p. 223.] 
2The real prices are calculated on the basis of year 1990. 
3Loadshedding means rationing of electricity at the time of shortage. Public Electric Power Industry 
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2.5 percent GDP).  In a production function approach, USAID (1988) estimated costs 
of loadshedding at nearly 2 percent of GDP and a fall in manufactured exports of 4 
percent.
4 
Despite a substantial increase of electric power generation during the past 
decades, the performance of this sector has been criticised on the basis of inadequate 
facilities relative to the growing demand. Since the efficiency of this sector is 
doubted today, it faces alternative policy reform such as build-own-operate-and-
transfer (BOOT), build-transfer-operate (BOT), lease-develop-operate (LDO), and 
vertical disintegration
5 [Ziauddin (1997) and Dawn (1997)]. Therefore, the intent of 
the present study is to investigate the performance of electric power sector of 
Pakistan at the firm level, as well as the sector as a whole, and identify and quantify 
the extent of inefficiency in the case of poor performance. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
Public enterprises in general and public infrastructure in particular are 
expected to fulfil complex multi-dimensional goals,
6 which makes it difficult to 
devise a satisfactory procedure to assess their performance.  Although many studies 
on public enterprises are limited to the profitability criterion,
7 it is unfair to evaluate 
this multi-objective sector on financial bases only.  However, the financial criterion 
cannot be neglected because of the overall budget constraint of the government. 
Thus, literature suggests that financial indicators must be used in conjunction with 
the factor productivity criteria. However, these criteria could be applied to 
commercial objectives only. 
As regards non-commercial objectives, Millward and Parker (1983); Jenkins 
and Lahouel (1983) and World Bank (1995) suggest that performance should be 
evaluated on the basis of cost effectiveness or unit cost of production while Pryke 
(1981) and OECD (1990) argue that the physical yardstick is neutral regarding 
ownership and social and economic costs and benefits. 
By considering all these arguments, it could be concluded that the 
performance of public enterprises should be evaluated through a basket of indicators, 
that should contain physical, financial, and productivity indicators relevant to the 
enterprises under consideration. A list of selective indicators used in the present 
study is shown in Table 1. 
 
4The variation among these results might be due to various units and different methodologies. It 
is, however, clear that in the past loadshedding had caused a serious damage to the economy. 
5Literature also uses the word “unbundling”. 
6Such as income distribution, industrial development, employment, etc. 
7For a detailed discussion on the subject, see Mann (1970); Peltzman (1971); Meyer (1975); 




Selective Indicators to Evaluate the Performance of Public Electric 
Power Industry in Pakistan 
Group           Indicators 
Physical  Growth in Physical Output 
 System  Losses 
  Generation Capacity Factor 
  
Financial   Net Profit Margin on Sale 
  Return on Capital 
  Unit Cost of Production 
  
Productivity Labour  Productivity 
 Capital  Productivity 
  Growth in Total Factor Productivity 
Source: Data and other information were obtained from published material of relevant enterprises and 
from The Planning Commission of Pakistan. These included Annual Reports, Power System 
Statistics, Five-Year Development Plans, etc. For full information on sources, see [Ghafoor 
(2000), p. 223.] 
 
4.  PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE 
Table 2 indicates that the growth in total electric power generation decreased 
both in WAPDA and KESC during 1960–77.  In the case of WAPDA, it may be a 
combined effect of its early period of establishment, a very slow progress on 
generation projects due to lack of resources, and rapidly changing government 
policies on power development. The same may be true for KESC except that it was 
already established and was expected to perform better than WAPDA.  Later, growth 
in total generation increased, which may be due to commissioning of the Terbela 
units and installation of new vintage steam and combine cycle power plants at 
various places in the case of WAPDA, and the establishing of a nuclear power plant 
outside Karachi in the case of KESC.  However, there may be various reasons for the 
later downward trend in growth of power generation such as malfunctioning of 
nuclear power plant, inadequate maintenance of old plants, negligible replacement of 
old age plants, etc. 
Although the growth in power generation was substantial during the 
period under consideration (an average increase of 12 percent per annum), the 
demand grew even faster and power shortage became a serious problem, which 
forced the rationing of power supply.  A simple reason for this outcome may be 
inefficient  use  of  available  installed  capacity.  Table 2 shows  the  generation  Table 2 
Selected Physical Indicators for Evaluating the Performance of State-owned Electric Power 
Industry in Pakistan (1961–95) 




Generation Capacity Factor 
(%) 
Years  WAPDA KESC  Power  WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA  KESC Power 
1960–65  26 17 24  26 17 24  34 47  36 
1966–71  15 14 15  31 19 28  45 42  44 
1972–77  7  4  7  34 22 32  46 42  45 
1978–83  12  9  12  32 23 31  50 48  48 
1984–89  10 12 10  26 26 26  52 50  50 
1990–95  8  5  8  23 33 26  54 50  52 
Average  13 10 12  29 33 28  47 47  46 




8 to analyse the capacity utilisation in WAPDA, KESC, and power 
industry as a whole. Although the generation capacity factor was well below that of 
WAPDA (34 percent) relative to KESC (49 percent) during 1960–65, it gradually 
increased over time and went up to 54 percent during 1990–95. On the other hand, in 
the case of KESC, it decreased during 1960–77, and then increased again during 
1978–95 and went up to 50 percent.  However, the average generation capacity 
factor for the power sector as a whole (46) is as good as that for other developing 
countries such as Hong Kong (43), Malaysia (42), and the Philippines (46.9) 
[Ghafoor (2000), p. 170].  Therefore, shortage of electricity cannot be blamed on 
inefficient use of available installed capacity. However, in the case of electricity, the 
total production could be different from actual delivery to the consumers, and this 
difference is called system losses.  These losses may be due to technical reasons such 
as unreliable and aging generation plants, low-voltage transmission, and distribution 
lines and inappropriate location of grid stations, as well as non-technical factors such 
as inaccurate metering and billing, default payments, un-metered supplies, and theft 
(through illegal connections). 
Table 2
* and Figure 1 show the total system losses
9 of WAPDA, KESC, and  
the  total  power  industry  during  1960–95.  In  the  case  of  WAPDA,  total system  
 
8Generation capacity factor is expressed as follows [Humplick (1993)]. 
Generation Capacity Factor = {Annual Gross Output (MWh) / Annual Installed Capacity (MW) 
x 8760} x 100. 
Where, 8760 are total number of hours in a year of 365 days. 
9Total system losses include auxiliary (the amount of electricity used with the generation 
process), transmission and distribution losses. 




















Fig. 1.  Total System Losses of WAPDA, KESC, and Power Industry 




10 increased from 26 to 38 percent during 1960–77. However, these losses 
decreased to 23 percent during 1978–95.  On the other hand, during 1960–77, total 
system losses of KESC were very low (from 17 to 22 percent) relative to WAPDA, 
but they gradually increased over time and went up to 33 percent during 1990–95. 
Since WAPDA has the largest share in total power industry, power industry has 
followed a trend similar to WAPDA’s.  The average system losses (28 percent) are, 
however, substantially higher than in other developing countries such as India (19 
percent), China (15 percent), the Philippines (19 percent), and Hong Kong (11 
percent) [Ghafoor (2000), p. 169)]. 
 
5.  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Public enterprises are often heavily criticised for making financial losses, 
which must be financed from central government budgets, contributing to budget 
deficits and macro-economic instability. Such criticisms can be misplaced in 
situations in which the prices that such enterprises are allowed to charge are not 
allowed to rise in line with costs.  Apparently, this has not been a problem for these 
enterprises in Pakistan, since neither sector has operated with financial losses for any 
significant time when net profit margin on sales was calculated before and after 
actual interest paid
11 (Table 3).  However, net profit margin on sales was substan-
tially decreased when actual interest payments were included into total costs. It 
indicates that a large part of investment is through borrowing and, therefore, net 
profit is very sensitive to interest payments.  Analysis of returns on capital
12 is also 
telling a similar story (Table 4).  
Financial data can be highly misleading, however, whenever markets are 
distorted by controls or function poorly due to lack of information or structural 
rigidities. The key to interpreting the results in Tables 3 and 4 lies in the terms on 
which finance was made available to the enterprises over this period. For example, 
WAPDA and KESC received grants from federal and provincial governments for 
specific jobs.  For instance, the Ministry of Water and Power provided funds from its 
current expenditure budget for ongoing research schemes, such as the  Khanpur and Hub  
 
10Total production could be different from actual delivery to the consumers and the difference 
between two two is called system losses. These are expressed in percentage terms and defined as the 
difference between total production and actual delivery as a proportion of total production [Humplick (1993)].  
11The most familiar concept of financial profit measures, the ratio of net profit (difference 
between total revenue and total cost) on sale, has been used in this study. Total revenue includes the 
revenue on sale of electricity and other operating revenue such as meter rent, late payment, other 
surcharges, etc., and total cost includes cost of generation (fuel cost, depreciation), transmission cost, 
distribution costs (selling, administration, research and development) and interest payments. Furthermore, 
net profit margin on sale has been calculated both before and after interest to demonstrate the significance 
of interest payments.  
12A detailed discussion on how the capital was calculated in this study has been made in the next 
section, under productivity analysis.  Table 3 
Various Concepts of Net Profit Margin on Sale of State-owned Electric Power Industry in Pakistan (1960–95) 
Net Profit Margin on Sale before 
Interest 
(%) 
Net Profit Margin on Sale after 
Interest (Actual)  
(%) 
Net Profit Margin on Sale after 10 
Percent Opportunity Cost on Capital 
(%) 
  Years  WAPDA KESC  Power WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA  KESC Power 
1960–65 31.49 29.94 34.33  5.68 20.37 13.96  –65.26  –29.28  –51.85 
1966–71 34.98 26.40 35.17  4.51 19.24 10.71  –63.61  –26.25  –52.75 
1972–77 26.15  8.20 25.28 –1.32 –0.38  1.50  –98.94  –88.58  –90.66 
1978–83 48.72 18.09 42.85 29.86  9.31 25.93  –42.34  –45.65  –44.21 
1984–89 33.46 17.01 31.77 15.54  5.27 14.82  –37.38  –50.65  –35.90 
1990–95 39.40 13.74 36.29 19.93  0.07 17.53  –26.43  –34.95  –28.88 
 Table 4 
Various Concepts of Return on Capital of State-owned Electric Power Industry in Pakistan (1960–95) 
Return on Capital before Interest 
(%) 
Return on Capital after Interest 
(Actual) 
(%) 
Return on Capital after 10 Percent 
Opportunity Cost on Capital 
(%) 
  Years  WAPDA KESC  Power WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA  KESC Power 
1960–65 3.34 4.89 4.06 0.65 1.84 1.69  –6.66  –2.93  –5.94 
1966–71 3.57 4.51 4.02 0.47 0.96 1.23  –6.43  –6.21  –5.98 
1972–77  2.16  1.49  2.28 –0.05  –0.23 0.21 –7.84  –8.11  –7.72 
1978–83 5.52 3.76 5.06 3.45 1.51 3.11  –4.48  –1.28  –4.94 
1984–89 4.80 3.29 4.73 2.26 0.19 2.33  –5.20  –5.91  –5.27 
1990–95 6.02 2.83 5.60 3.05 0.05 2.71  –3.98  –5.17  –4.40 
 Ghafoor and Weiss 
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Dam projects. Funds for electrification projects were provided by the respective 
provincial government as a grant. WAPDA also received a continuous special grant 
from the Public Sector Development Programme (a federal government scheme to 
finance the public sector). 
Most of the local loans were either at low interest rates or were interest-free.  
For instance, KESC received an interest-free loan of Rupees 132.57 million from the 
federal government in 1982 for electrification of Balochistan province. Where interest 
was paid, it was very low as compared to the interest paid by private borrowers. 
Moreover, there was a hidden subsidy on foreign loans. For instance, both 
WAPDA and KESC repaid their loans to the Government of Pakistan in local 
currency at the rate of exchange prevailing on the respective dates of disbursement. 
Any inflation and the resulting increase in debt service were paid by the government, 
not the enterprises. Further, KESC also received a subsidy from the Government of 
Pakistan ranging from 3.25 percent to 6.75 percent per annum on outstanding foreign 
loans. This indicates that the total financial cost of electricity supply was well below 
the real economic cost incurred.
13  
It is not possible to quantify the precise impact of each individual component 
of financial assistance, due to unavailability of actual amount of grants, local and 
foreign loans over 36 years, and the complications involved in their valuation. 
However, an approximate indication can be obtained by using a fairly acceptable 
opportunity cost of capital employed. Therefore, the actual interest rate was replaced 
by a notional real annual capital charge set at 10 percent of capital assets in a 
particular year.
14  In Tables 3 and 4, revised profitability ratios are given with profit 
net of this notional capital charge rather than actual interest paid. Now it can be seen 
that the two power enterprises are significantly unprofitable in all years. The 
implication is that in financial terms, none of the enterprises was able to generate a 
surplus equal to the estimated opportunity cost of investment funds, and that users 
were not charged tariffs that reflected the true costs of supplying electric power. 
Apart from a monopoly behaviour, a higher ratio of net profit margin and net 
return on capital implies a better performance of a firm. It does not mean that the 
firm with a lower rate of profit is inefficient. For instance, a firm might be 
minimising cost for a given output even though profits are not maximised due to 
price control by the government.  On the other hand, high profits do not necessarily 
reflect efficient firms since the objective of profit maximisation can be achieved by 
exercising monopoly power to obtain factor inputs at unduly low prices or through 
selling products at higher than competitive prices.  Therefore, profitability and ratios 
associated with it are ambiguous performance indicators and can be misleading if a 
 
13It, however, can be said with assurance that in either case, whether it is grant for a specific 
project or subsidies on foreign or local loan, the sum entered the capital stock figure.  
14In an earlier study, Weiss (1980) also estimated a similar opportunity cost of capital of 10 
percent for Pakistan in the late 1970s. Public Electric Power Industry 
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firm operates in a monopolistic environment or the government controls the price of 
output. Since both WAPDA and KESC are monopolistic firms and the government 
controls prices, high profitability before and after actual interest paid could be 
criticised on the ground of high rates of tariff.  In this situation, the efficiency of 
firms could be examined in two ways: first, by looking at the trend in real price of 
electricity throughout the period under consideration; and, second, by examining the 
unit cost of production. 
Figure 2 shows that the price of electricity in the case of WAPDA has fallen 
slightly in real terms in the long run. Since WAPDA and power industry as a whole 
show an upward trend in net profit margin, the high profit is unlikely to be a function 
of higher price. On the other hand, the real price of KESC has increased over time 
because of higher fuel adjustment charges in 1985-86. It indicates that the declining 


































































































Regarding unit cost of production, Table 5 indicates that there is a general 
downward trend in all four concepts of unit cost during the period under 
consideration.
15 It is, however, important to note that the declining trend in unit cost 
was  faster  in the case of WAPDA relative to KESC.  It is because the power system  
 
15Since public managers do not have any control over interest and fuel price, evaluation of their 
performance would be misleading by including these costs. Therefore, a concept of controllable cost has 
been included in this study which measures the performance of sate-owned enterprises by looking at cost 
without interest and fuel cost. 
Fig. 2.  Unit Price in Real Term for Electricity in the Case of WAPDA 




























































 Table 5 
Various Concepts of Unit Cost of Production (Rupees) of State-owned Electric Power Industry in Pakistan (1960–95) 
Unit Cost before Fuel Cost 
and Interest  Unit Cost before Interest 
Unit Cost after Actual 
Interest Paid 
Unit Cost after 10 Percent 
Opportunity Cost of 
Capital 
  Years  WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA KESC Power  WAPDA KESC Power 
1960–65  0.42 0.52  0.45  0.53 2.15  0.56  0.73 2.21  0.77  1.29 2.67  1.31 
1966–71  0.26 0.38  0.27  0.38 1.63  0.40  0.56 1.68  0.57  0.95 1.99  0.96 
1972–77  0.24 0.45  0.26  0.33 1.46  0.36  0.46 1.53  0.48  0.90 1.95  0.92 
1978–83  0.24 0.36  0.26  0.33 0.78  0.39  0.45 0.85  0.50  0.91 1.25  0.96 
1984–89  0.27 0.42  0.29  0.48 0.75  0.52  0.61 0.87  0.65  0.99 1.24  1.04 
1990–95  0.24 0.37  0.25  0.47 0.59  0.51  0.63 0.72  0.66  1.00 1.07  1.03 
Average  0.28 0.42  0.29  0.42 1.23  0.45  0.57 1.31  0.60  1.01 1.70  1.04 
 Public Electric Power Industry 
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of WAPDA consists of hydel and thermal power plants, while KESC consists of only 
thermal power plants. Since, hydel power is cheaper than thermal, any increase in 
hydel power will reduce the average unit cost of generation. Historical data indicate 
that WAPDA started with a high proportion of hydel power, which substantially 
increased during 1968–83 due to the commissioning of Tarbela and Mangla units. 
Therefore, WAPDA shows a lower cost as compared to KESC over the period under 
consideration.   
 
6.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
As financial information gives only a very partial and misleading picture of 
performance, it is necessary to go further and consider the economic efficiency of the 
enterprises. For this purpose, we use a production function approach to estimate the 
trend in growth of total factor productivity (TFP) over the period studied. TFP 
should capture the improvements in the efficiency of factor use since it reflects 
growth in output that is not attributable to growth in factor inputs. We use the 
following version of the Cobb-Douglas production function where t represents time, 
Vt measures real value added, Kt measures capital
16 input and Lt measures labour 
input.
17 
β α λ = t t
t
t L K e A V 0   … … … … … …  (1) 
where  A0 = Scale parameter. 
  λ  = Growth rate of productivity. 
α  = Elasticity of output with respect to capital, holding labour constant.  
β  = Elasticity of output with respect to labour, holding capital constant. 
t  = Time. 
 
 
16The series for capital are generated with the help of the formula, i.e., Kt = Kt–1 + (∆Kt), where  
Kt–1 is initial level of capital (which was total assets after depreciation) and ∆Kt represent the change in 
capital in current year {(Net Fixed Assets +Work in Progress) – Depreciation} + Working Capital 
{(Current Assets – Current Liabilities)}. All figures have been calculated on the basis of constant price of 
1990 by using consumer price index. 
17Labour is the total number of employees in a firm as given by the Annual Reports of these 
firms. Some economists believe that the number of employees at a given time-period is not a good 
variable since it does not take into account the quality of individual worker. Therefore, a better measure 
such as the weighted cost of labour according to their wages should be used. It can be argued that the main 
objective of such study is not to estimate the productivity of individual worker but an average productivity 
of the whole labour force working in a firm. Furthermore, the wage system in Pakistan is very complex 
and it is hardly mentioned in the published material on individual basis.  Moreover, pay scales are revised 
by the Government of Pakistan from time to time and it is very hard to find such detailed information for 
35 years.  It is also believed that the salary does not reflect the true picture of labour quality.  Therefore, 
we decided to use the number of workers, which seems to be a better measure in this situation.  However, 
since the quality of labour did improve during the study period, our productivity growth would be slightly 
upward-biased.  Ghafoor and Weiss 
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Since the function is non-linear, we estimate Equation (1) as, 
t t t o t e l k t a v + β + α + λ + =   …  … … … …  (2) 
where the lower case indicates that logarithms are used. The intercept ao reflects the 
initial level of productivity, and  λ  reflects growth of TFP as discussed above. 
In our analysis we use real value-added, to avoid the distortion caused by the 
price control policy of the government. Nominal value-added is deflated by the price 
index for electricity output using a base year of 1990. A complication arises when a 
function such as this is estimated for sectors, like power, where there are 
discontinuous jumps in capacity, since this will disturb the underlying relationship 
between factors and output. To cope with this problem, we use a dummy variable for 
each jump in capacity.
18 
Hence our final version of Equation (1) for power will be, 
t c c t t o t e D D l k t a v + γ + γ + β + α + λ + = 2 2 1 1   … … …  (3) 
where Dc1 and Dc2 refer to dummies for each jump in capacity for the years 1968 and 
1983, respectively.  Table 6 reports our results for the power sector. 
The estimated equation has performed fairly well and all parameter estimates 
are statistically significant. The DW statistics are also acceptable. 
Referring to Table 6, the intercept ‘a0’ provides information about the initial 
level of total factor productivity, which is negative in the case of WAPDA, while the 
coefficient  λ, giving the growth rate of total factor productivity, is positive for 
WAPDA. These results indicate that although WAPDA had negative productivity
19 
at the start of the period, total factor productivity has grown at a rate of 1.52 percent. 
On the other hand since KESC was established in 1913 and working at full 
capacity in 1960, a higher level of technical efficiency, and consequently higher level 
of  initial  productivity, was expected.  A positive  sign  of  the  intercept  confirms  that  
 
18In the case of WAPDA, the first jump was caused by the commissioning of 6 units of Mangla 
Dam during 1968. It added 600 MW to the total generating capacity which increased growth in power 
generation from 4 percent to 19 percent. A second jump was due to the commissioning of 4 units of 
Terbela Dam and two more units of Mangla Dam, which added 960 MW to the total installed capacity and 
increased the growth in power generation to 33 percent in 1983. In the case of KESC, there was only one 
large jump during 1985 due to the commissioning of Bin Qasim thermal power plant of 420 MW capacity, 
which increased the growth in electric power from 17 percent to 24 percent. Since these additions caused a 
large increased in installed capacity, it would certainly lower the measured productivity in the short run. 
These dummies have been used to neutralise this disturbing effect which is assumed to last for just one 
year.   
19In constant growth models, as used in this study, the intercept estimates the real value of the 
value-added in the initial year. It means that in our case the value-added was negative in 1960, with inputs 
and outputs valued at 1990 prices. There could be several reasons for this outcome. The main reason may 
be that WAPDA was in its development stage, where the cost of production was always higher than the 
revenue because most of generation plants were not working at full capacity. Therefore, output was 




Parameter Estimates of Electric Power Industries in Pakistan Using 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function 




































2 0.57  0.59  0.62 
DW 1.87  1.82  1.69 
Figures in the parenthesis are t values. 
  * The coefficients are significant at 5 percent level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 1 percent level. 
 
KESC had a relatively higher level of initial productivity than WAPDA. However, 
total factor productivity has declined at a rate of –1.65 percent which indicates that 
the technical efficiency of KESC has deteriorated over time. It could be concluded 
that although WAPDA was relatively less efficient than KESC in the early period of 
its establishment, it has performed better in the long run, with a modest but positive 
growth rate of TFP. On the other hand, KESC shows slightly higher productivity in 
the earlier period, but the situation has deteriorated over time because of a significant 
decline of TFP.  Total factor productivity for the electric power sector as a whole has 
grown, however modestly, at a rate of 0.37 percent. 
Although only two firms are involved in the power sector, inter-firm 
differences in the growth of TFP are confirmed through a panel data approach, by 
including another dummy variable representing inter-firm difference (Df) in the 
Equation (3) in addition to capacity dummies. Results of the panel data approach are 




Parameter Estimates, Using Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
with Panel Data 
Parameters Coefficients 
ao  –3.2457 
(–3.39)** 
λ  0.0039 
(3.41)** 
α  0.7981 
(4.30)** 
β  0.5526 
(3.94)** 
γ1  0.1928 
(3.99)** 
γ2  0.1134 
(3.91)** 
γ3  0.0349 
(3.01)** 




DW  1.80 
Figures in the parenthesis are t values. 
  * The coefficients are significant at 5 percent level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 1 percent level. 
 
The coefficient for firm dummy is negative and statistically significant at 1 
percent level. Since WAPDA is represented by zero and KESC by one, the negative 
sign confirms that WAPDA is technically more efficient than KESC and these inter-
firm differences are statistically significant. 
Our results also indicate increasing returns to scale. For the power sector, the 
sum of the partial elasticities is greater than unity (0.70+0.52=1.20). So far as the 
individual electricity companies are concerned, WAPDA has a greater sum of partial 
elasticities than KESC but both have sums greater than unity, indicating increasing 
returns. The lower figure for KESC is due to a technology mix  (thermal plants only 
as compared to hydel and thermal for WAPDA) as well as the productivity 
differences noted above. 
Our economic indicator, TFP growth, gives a very different picture of 
performance to the financial indicators. The results imply that only a very low Public Electric Power Industry 
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proportion of growth is due to improvements in the efficiency of factor use. However, 
there is no absolute benchmark with which these TFP results can be compared. Some 
sector studies have revealed significant TFP growth in publicly owned infrastructure 
enterprises. For example, Pryke (1981) estimated TFP growth of 8 percent annually for 
the UK electricity sector in the period 1968–73, which is well above the WAPDA 
growth of 1.4 percent. However, later work on the UK for the period 1978–83 found a 
much lower TFP growth, of broadly the same rate as that of WAPDA [Molyneux and 
Thompson (1987)].
20 It may not be fair to compare the performance of Pakistan’s 
public enterprises with those in developed economies, but it is reasonable to expect 
modest, and positive, TFP growth from important state-run enterprises. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our results show that although WAPDA has performed slightly better than 
KESC, neither of the enterprises has done well in the long run.  For instance, in 
terms of financial performance, the average annual net profit after interest, as a 
proportion of sale for both WAPDA (12 percent) and KESC (9 percent), is 
substantially lower than net profit for the public corporation for electricity in Turkey, 
i.e., in the range of 20-36 percent.
21 In terms of economic performance, TFP growth 
has been negative in the case of KESC and relatively low in the case of WAPDA, as 
compared to the TFP growth calculated by Pryke (1981) for the electric power 
industry in the United Kingdom, i.e., 8.7 percent. This does not confirm the case for 
privatisation  per se, but it does indicate the need for improvement on past 
performance. Therefore, the case for reforming these enterprises is strong, and 
alternative modes of organisation, finance, and ownership need to be considered. 
In Pakistan, as elsewhere, there has been some discussion of ways of 
involving private capital in infrastructure development activities.
22  In the context of 
the power sector, most attention is given to ways of unbundling integrated public 
enterprises; thus for example in power, separating generation, transmission, and 
distribution, and introducing competition between suppliers. Therefore, the issue 
should not be the ownership, but rather an appropriate reform package that could suit 
the specific environment for economic development of Pakistan. 
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